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The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  forward-looking  disclosures  and  corporate  reputation
lead  to  a  reduction  in  stock  return volatility.  This  study  measures  ﬁnancial  forward-looking  information,
by  conducting  a content  analysis  of annual  reports  for  a sample  of  US  companies.  Since every annual
report  was  manually  examined  and  coded,  the  study  is  therefore  restricted  to  the  companies  listed  in
Standard  and  Poor’s  100.  Results  show  that  ﬁnancial  forward-looking  information  has  signiﬁcant  effects
on capital  markets.  This  study  contributes  to the  current  literature  on  voluntary  disclosure,  by examin-
ing  the  link  between  the  disclosure  of  ﬁnancial  forward-looking  information  and  stock  return  volatility.
Since  stock  volatility  is linked  to  information  asymmetries  and  to  a higher  risk of  a  company,  this  anal-
ysis  implies  certain  practical  implications  for  both  managers  and regulators  regarding  the  importance
of  speciﬁc  disclosure  strategy  in  capital  markets.  Moreover,  results  indicate  that  forward-looking  infor-
mation  disclosed  by  companies  of a higher  reputation  has a greater  effect  on  stock  return  volatility.  This
is  the ﬁrst  study  that  demonstrates  that  corporate  reputation  moderates  the  effects  of  forward-looking
information  in  capital  markets.  In addition  to the  level  of disclosed  information,  the  interpretation  and
the  effectiveness  of  forward-looking  information  depends  on  the  reputation  of a company.
©  2015  ASEPUC.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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El  objetivo  de  este  trabajo  es investigar  si la  divulgación  de  información  previsional  y la  reputación  cor-
porativa  llevan  a una  reducción  de  la volatilidad  de  las  acciones.  La  información  previsional  ﬁnanciera  es
medida  mediante  un  análisis  del  contenido  de  los  informes  anuales  de  una  muestra  de  empresas  esta-
dounidenses.  Puesto  que cada  informe  anual  fue  examinado  y codiﬁcado  manualmente,  la muestra  se
limita  a  las  empresas  que aparecen  en  Standard  and  Poor’s  100.  Los  resultados  muestran  que  la divul-
gación  de  información  previsional  ﬁnanciera  tiene  efectos  signiﬁcativos  en  los mercados  de  capitales.  El
trabajo  contribuye  a  la literatura  existente,  examinando  la  relación  entre  la  divulgación  de  información
previsional  ﬁnanciera  y la  volatilidad  de  las  acciones.  Dado  que  la volatilidad  de  las  acciones  se asocia  a
la existencia  de  asimetrías  informativas  y a un  mayor  riesgo  de  las  empresas,  los  resultados  tienen  impli-
caciones  directas  para  empresas  y reguladores  respecto  a la  importancia  de  las estrategias  especíﬁcas
de divulgación  de  información  previsional.  Adicionalmente,  la  información  previsional  divulgada  por  las
empresas  más  reputadas  tiene  un  mayor  efecto  en la volatilidad  de  las  acciones.  Este  es  el  primer  estudio
que  demuestra  que  la  reputación  corporativa  modera  los  efectos  de  la  información  previsional  en  los
mercados  de  capitales.  La  interpretación  y  la  efectividad  de  la  información  previsional  no  depende  sólo
del  nivel  de  divulgación,  sino  también  de  la  reputación  de  una  empresa.
© 2015  ASEPUC.  Publicado  
E-mail address: pacobravo@us.es
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In theory, increased levels of disclosure reduce the possibility
f information asymmetries, as measured through bid-ask spread,
tock liquidity and stock return volatility (Cormier, Ledoux, & Aerts,
010). Nevertheless, the literature provides no clear deﬁnition of
he concept of “increased levels of disclosure” (Leuz & Verrecchia,
000). Previous research suggests that information quality affects
he uncertainty about the future of a company and stock volatil-
ty (Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Pastor & Veronesi, 2003). Disclosure
ay  take various forms, and not all kinds of information dis-
losure would have the same impact on capital markets. Both
anagers and policymakers are interested in ascertaining which
nformation is useful for investors and which can have an effect
n capital markets. Speciﬁcally, forward-looking information has
ecome crucial, since historical information could be insufﬁcient
or investors. Both organisms and researchers have stated the sig-
iﬁcance of forward-looking information in order to improve the
orecasts about a company and ease decision-making processes in
apital markets. Despite stock volatility being a concern for both
egulators and managers, the association between forward-looking
nformation and stock return volatility remains unexplored. On the
ther hand, there is an ongoing debate concerning how investors
alue and interpret the information disclosed by companies (Beyer,
ohen, & Beverly, 2010). Each company transmits a different degree
f conﬁdence to the markets. The vast majority of studies have
ocused on the level of information disclosed, but the effects of
isclosure practices can be further varied depending on corporate
eputation. Although the resource-based theory emphasizes the
mportance of corporate reputation, evidence fails to demonstrate
hat this intangible resource can also inﬂuence disclosure practices
nd changes in the stock price. Since the reputation of the mes-
enger should play an important role in the effectiveness of the
essage (Mercel, 2004), investors may  have a positive emotional
redisposition when interpreting information disclosed by ﬁrms
ith a high reputation.
This paper extends previous research by analyzing the effect of
nancial forward-looking information (such as earnings forecasts,
xpected revenues, and anticipated cash ﬂows) on stock return
olatility. This information can provide a major source of corporate
isclosure differentiation, since it is veriﬁable ex-post, and hence
ts disclosure may  lead to greater accountability and an increase in
eputational costs. Research has speciﬁcally considered the disclo-
ure of forward-looking information of a ﬁnancial nature, however
revious studies have yet to analyse the relationship between this
nformation and stock return volatility. This paper also analyses
he effect of the ﬁnancial forward-looking information disclosed
y most reputable ﬁrms on stock return volatility. This is the ﬁrst
tudy that investigates how corporate reputation moderates the
ffects of forward-looking information. This study extends previ-
us research by showing that, in addition to the level of disclosure
nd the source of information, the reputation of a ﬁrm may  also
nﬂuence the effect in capital markets of the information disclosed
y companies. Information disclosed by ﬁrms of a higher reputa-
ion can better mitigate stock volatility through an enhancement
f the credibility of the information.
The sample of this study is made up of the companies in the
tandard and Poor’s 100 in the year 2009. In order to measure
he level of information, all annual reports are individually exam-
ned and manually coded. The results show that the disclosure of
nancial forward-looking information reduces stock return volatil-
ty. Managers could beneﬁt from these ﬁndings, which support the
dea that investors and ﬁnancial analysts take advantage of ﬁnan-
ial forward-looking information. Furthermore, these results may
ell be of interest to regulators, as they could set information
equirements more efﬁciently to reduce information asymmetriescounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 122–131 123
in capital markets. Secondly, the results suggest that ﬁnancial
forward-looking information disclosed by companies with a bet-
ter corporate reputation is more effective in reducing stock return
volatility. This evidence is relevant for managers, who  must be
aware of the importance of the creation and maintenance of cor-
porate reputation in the effectiveness of disclosure strategies.
The paper proceeds as follows. “Theoretical framework and
hypothesis development” section contains a conceptual back-
ground and the hypothesis development. “Research design” section
describes the sample and explains the research design. The main
results of the study are presented in “Empirical results” section.
Summary and conclusions are provided in “Conclusion remarks”
section.
Theoretical framework and hypothesis development
Theory predicts that an increase in the level of disclosure should
reduce information asymmetries in capital markets, and this would
lead to many potential beneﬁts (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Corpo-
rate disclosure is crucial for the functioning of capital markets,
and several potential effects have been associated to a reduction
in information asymmetries: an improvement in stocks liquidity,
a decrease in companies’ cost of capital, and an increase in ﬁnan-
cial analysts’ following (Healy & Palepu, 2001). In particular, low
levels of volatility suggest fewer information asymmetries, and pre-
vious studies have considered stock return volatility as a proxy for
information asymmetry (Cormier et al., 2010; Lang & Lundholm,
1993; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Stock return volatility has received
a great deal of attention since it is an important issue in both
theory and practice. An increase in stock return volatility would
lead to a higher perception of the risk of a ﬁrm and hence, a rise
in the cost of capital of companies (Bushee & Noe, 2000). These
authors also state that volatility can become a negative indicator
for ﬁrm value, thereby making stock-price compensation less effec-
tive and/or more costly. The increase of stock volatility in recent
years and the expected impact of information asymmetries on stock
prices have raised questions about whether ﬁnancial information
can mitigate stock return volatility (Rajgopal & Venkatachalam,
2011). Prior research in the accounting and ﬁnance literature offers
several reasons why information can affect stock return volatility.
Speciﬁcally, a decrease in information asymmetries would imply a
reduction in the periodic surprises about a ﬁrm and make its stock
price less volatile (Bushee & Noe, 2000). Pastor and Veronesi (2003)
argue that poor information quality affects the uncertainty about
the future performance of a company. Easley and O’Hara (2004) ﬁnd
that ﬁnancial reporting quality inﬂuences the information environ-
ment of a company and hence, its cost of capital and stock volatility.
Nevertheless, the literature lacks any provision of evidence con-
cerning the relationship between the disclosure of forward-looking
information and stock return volatility.
Literature on disclosure tends to use general measures of
information based on subjective ratings provided by analysts
(Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Haggard, Martin, & Pereira, 2008)
or self-constructed indices (Botosan, 1997; Michelon, 2013;
Rodríguez-Domínguez & Noguera-Gámez, 2014). The majority of
prior studies that have analysed the effect of voluntary disclo-
sure on capital markets have focused on the level of the disclosed
information in the annual reports. Although capital market par-
ticipants are expected to use all sources of information to make
decisions about a company, annual report disclosures are shown to
be highly correlated with other ways of communication (Botosan,
1997; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). Both mandatory and voluntary
information have been addressed by researchers. Speciﬁc types
of information have been examined: intellectual capital (Husin,
Hooper, & Olesen, 2010), segment information (Prencipe, 2004),
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dence on the credibility of voluntary disclosures focuses on the24 F. Bravo / Revista de Contabilidad – Span
nvironmental information (Husillos & Álvarez-Gil, 2008), infor-
ation on corporate social responsibility (Aribi & Gao, 2012) and
ustainability (Rodríguez-Ariza, Frías, & García, 2014), or informa-
ion on risks (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Rodríguez-Domínguez &
oguera-Gámez, 2014), among others. Not all types of information
ay  have an effect on capital markets. In this study, a disclosure
easure based on forward-looking information is designed, by
ssuming that this information is valuable in the decision-making
rocess.
Previous empirical evidence shows that forward-looking dis-
losure practices of ﬁrms are relatively conservative since the
isclosure of this information is costly. First, it may  provide use-
ul information for competitors and lead to proprietary costs.
oreover, managers are exposed to potential litigation and reputa-
ional costs if they disclose inaccurate forward-looking information
Celik, Ecer, & Karabacak, 2006). However, under an agency per-
pective, companies can voluntarily disclose information in order
o reduce conﬂicts of interest between managers and investors
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, the disclosure of spe-
iﬁc information can provide a strategy to manage relations with
takeholders (Ullmann, 1985). According to stakeholders’ theory,
isclosure strategies are essential mechanisms for companies to
nﬂuence the perceptions and expectations about a company and
o satisfy stakeholders’ needs (Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga, & Spence,
009; Michelon, 2013).
In particular, in the U.S., the disclosure of forward-looking infor-
ation is speciﬁcally promoted through the “safe harbor” rules.
he purpose of these rules is to encourage the voluntary disclosure
f forward-looking information by removing the deterrent of lia-
ility in making such disclosures. In 1995, the SEC adopted rules
o provide “safe harbor” protection for forward-looking informa-
ion. The disclosure of this information is not considered fraudulent
nless it is shown that such a statement was made or reafﬁrmed
ithout reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good
aith. Although the disclosure of forward-looking information is
romoted, there are no rules about the report of ﬁnancial forward-
ooking information in the US context. Companies are expected to
eveal this information only when the associated beneﬁts exceed
he costs of disclosure (Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2004).
In line with agency theory, the disclosure of forward-looking
nformation can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and
mprove the decision-making process, and hence the cost of ﬁnan-
ing for companies may  be reduced (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007).
he rapid changes in the economic environment make histori-
al information insufﬁcient for stakeholders, and the publication
f forward-looking information may  help investors improve their
orecasts about a company (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The disclo-
ure of this information is also assumed to reduce the information
ap between ﬁrms and investors by improving the anticipa-
ion of future earnings (Schleicher & Walker, 1999), share price
Hussainey, Schleicher, & Walker, 2003), and the future perfor-
ance of a ﬁrm (Hussainey & Aal-Eisa, 2009). The disclosure of
orward-looking information has been associated with higher accu-
acy in analysts’ forecasts (Barron, Kile, & O’Keefe, 1999), increased
nalyst following (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), and lower information
isk (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Therefore, potential ben-
ﬁts from the disclosure of forward-looking information have been
tated by both organisms (AICPA, 1994; CICA, 2002; FASB, 2001)
nd researchers.
Nevertheless, forward-looking information is a broad concept
hich includes a variety of disclosures, and the content of this
nformation is also an important issue. The disclosure of forward-
ooking information with a ﬁnancial nature has speciﬁcally been
xamined by some researchers (Celik et al., 2006; Hussainey et al.,
003), since this information is assumed to be value-relevant for
nvestors. In this line, other studies have paid attention to thecounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 122–131
disclosure of earnings forecasts (Hirst, Koonce, & Venkataraman,
2008; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005).
This study extends prior literature on voluntary disclosure, in
particular, research on forward-looking information, by examin-
ing the link between the disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-looking
information and stock return volatility.
Financial forward-looking information is expected to be more
credible since it is easily veriﬁable and its disclosure may  lead to
greater accountability. Moreover, since ﬁnancial forward-looking
information is precise and refers to the future performance of
a company, this information is likely to be value-relevant for
investors.
From an agency perspective, the disclosure of value-relevant
information reduces the uncertainty about a company and
therefore mitigates information asymmetries. Since information
asymmetries can affect stock return volatility, the application of
agency theory implies a relationship between stock volatility and
the disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-looking information.
From the above discussion, the following hypothesis is formu-
lated:
H1. The disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-looking information leads
to a reduction of stock return volatility.
Furthermore, this paper also extends previous literature by
examining the effect of forward-looking information disclosed by
ﬁrms of a higher reputation, under the premise that the informa-
tion provided by these ﬁrms has a greater mitigating effect on stock
volatility. Corporate reputation represents the perception of the
quality of the ﬁrm’s management (Hammond & Slocum, 1996) and
can be expected to increase the investors’ conﬁdence in a ﬁrm.
First, this assumption relies on the psychological effect that
corporate reputation can have on investors. Forward-looking dis-
closures by ﬁrms with a higher reputation can be more credible for
investors and have a greater effect in the mitigation of information
asymmetries, by reducing the uncertainty about a company.
On the one hand, it is obvious that investors’ behaviour can also
be determined by social and psychological aspects, and corporate
reputation may  have positive effects on the emotional predisposi-
tion of individual investors (Helm, 2007). Capital market agents
can perceive ﬁrms with a higher reputation as more solid, and
therefore the image of a ﬁrm may  be considered an intangible fac-
tor that determines investors’ loyalty and conﬁdence. Since stock
return volatility may  also reﬂect irrational sentiments of investors
(Venkatachalam, 2000), this volatility could be determined by cor-
porate reputation.
Beyond the individual effect of corporate reputation on stock
volatility, it can also be expected that the reputation of a company
inﬂuences the way investors interpret its disclosures. Although
prior studies have generally focused on the level of forward-looking
information, the way  that investors perceive the information dis-
closed by companies is also expected to be important to reduce
information asymmetries. Corporate reputation can play an impor-
tant role in the reduction of the uncertainty of the information
disclosed by ﬁrms, thereby affecting the way  that investors make
decisions. The information disclosed by ﬁrms of a higher reputa-
tion may  be more credible, and the credibility of information is a
key factor for investors to make decisions (Schwarzkopf, 2007).
For the disclosure in ﬁnancial statements, credibility is
enhanced by independent audit ﬁrms that certify whether ﬁnancial
reporting decisions by managers are consistent with accounting
standards (Kothari, Li, & Short, 2010). However, much of the evi-accuracy and stock price effects of management forecasts (Healy
& Palepu, 2001). Nevertheless, speciﬁc ﬁrms’ characteristics can
also be expected to affect disclosure credibility. For example, Frost
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selected from the sample, were examined independently by two
different researchers, and the results were satisfactory. In order
to guarantee the internal validity of the measure of ﬁnancial
1 In addition, for the calculation of the log of the standard deviation of daily stock
returns, at least 6 months of daily return observations was required, and the ﬁnalF. Bravo / Revista de Contabilidad – Span
1997) ﬁnds evidence that disclosure credibility declines for ﬁnan-
ially distressed ﬁrms.
Particularly, there is no research about the relationship between
orporate reputation and the effectiveness of ﬁnancial information
isclosed in annual reports. Corporate reputation may  inﬂuence
he way that investors use ﬁnancial information, especially when
rms report voluntary information that is not subject to regulation.
n particular, forward-looking information needs to be credible in
rder to have an effect on capital markets. This information can be
ore credible for ﬁrms with a higher reputation, since corporate
eputation could lead to an increase in investors’ trust. In theory,
he reputation of the messenger should play an important role in
he effectiveness of the message (Mercel, 2004). Therefore, it is
xpected that ﬁrms with a high reputation increase the believability
f their forward-looking voluntary disclosures.
Despite the discussion presented above, the role of corporate
eputation in both disclosure strategies and the reduction of stock
olatility still remains an open research question. According to
he previous arguments, the combined effect of ﬁnancial forward-
ooking information and corporate reputation is examined in order
o analyse whether information disclosed by companies of a higher
eputation has a greater effect on stock volatility. Therefore, the
ollowing hypothesis is formulated:
2. The disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-looking information by
rms of a higher reputation (versus ﬁrms of lower reputation) has
 greater effect in the reduction of stock return volatility.
esearch design
ample
The ﬁnal sample was composed of 73 non-ﬁnancial companies
ncluded in Standard and Poor’s 100 in the year 2009. The U.S.
quity market is the world’s largest, and U.S. returns hold sub-
tantial inﬂuence for many non-U.S. returns (Rapach, Strauss, &
hou, 2013). Furthermore, the U.S. context is inﬂuenced by the
xistence of safe-harbour rules, which promote the disclosure of
orward-looking information. Companies in S&P 100 are more vis-
ble and they are likely to disclose more information. The recent
nancial crisis was characterised by extreme stock price volatil-
ty (Ozenbas & San Vicente Portes, 2013). The need for corporate
ransparency is enhanced in periods of crisis, and the question con-
erning the impact of speciﬁc disclosures on stock volatility gathers
reater signiﬁcance. The analysis is limited to one year because
rm’s disclosure policies are expected to remain constant over time
Abraham & Cox, 2007; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002).
The disclosure measure was calculated by reading and analyz-
ng all annual reports from 2009. One of the common limitations
f hand-collected data is that sample sizes are traditionally small,
ince the process is a very time-consuming task. Abraham and Cox
2007), Aljifri and Hussainey (2007), Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2004),
usin et al. (2010), and Prencipe (2004), also carried out con-
ent analysis techniques by using hand-collected data for samples
etween 30 and 72 ﬁrms.
eﬁnition of variables
he dependent variable: stock return volatility
In order to analyse the effect of disclosure on stock return volatil-
ty, data about daily prices in 2010 were collected, since annual
eports for the year 2009 were published in 2010. Therefore, the
hange in share prices immediately after the publication of the
nnual reports was measured. Stock return volatility (STDRET)
as calculated in logarithmic terms (Bushee & Noe, 2000; García
ara, García Osma, & Pen˜alva, 2014), as the natural log of onecounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 122–131 125
plus the standard deviation of daily stock returns. A minimum of
three months of daily return observations was required to calcu-
late stock volatility1; therefore companies with a lower number of
observations were dropped from the sample. Validation tests were
performed to conﬁrm that this variable captures the risk of a ﬁrm,
and the results were satisfactory, as shown in the next section.
The independent variable: information disclosure
The level of ﬁnancial forward-looking information was captured
by examining annual reports published by companies. The annual
report is chosen since it has been traditionally considered to be an
inﬂuential source of information for investors (Lang & Lundholm,
1993; Marston & Shrives, 1991). Furthermore, annual report disclo-
sure is highly correlated with other ﬁnancial communications (Lang
& Lundholm, 1993). This paper aims to analyse the effect of volun-
tary forward-looking information on the markets. Annual reports
were downloaded from companies’ websites. Regulated sections
(ﬁnancial statements and notes) were excluded from the analysis
and only voluntary narrative disclosures in the annual report were
examined.2
Forward-looking disclosure refers to current plans and future
forecasts that enable investors and other users to assess a com-
pany’s future ﬁnancial performance (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007).
Forward-looking disclosure involves both ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial information. This paper focuses on speciﬁc ﬁnancial
information, such as earnings forecasts, expected revenues, antic-
ipated cash ﬂows, or any other ﬁnancial indicator. A number of
studies have suggested that the disclosure of forward-looking infor-
mation of a ﬁnancial nature, and particularly about earnings, is
value-relevant for investors (Celik et al., 2006; Hirst et al., 2008;
Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 2009). This information is easily ex-post
veriﬁable, and ﬁnancially veriﬁable disclosures are more effective
than unveriﬁable disclosures at improving accuracy and reducing
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Bozzolan, Trombetta, & Beretta,
2009).
Content analysis techniques were used to quantify the amount
of ﬁnancial forward-looking information in the annual reports. The
ﬁnancial forward-looking disclosure variable (FFLDIS) refers to the
number of sentences within an individual annual report which
contain this information. Each piece of information was  manually
analysed to select all the sentences with ﬁnancial forward-looking
information. The use of sentences as a unit of measure for dis-
closure has been established as providing complete, reliable and
meaningful data for further analysis (Milne & Adler, 1999). Pre-
vious studies on forward-looking disclosure have also employed
sentences in order to measure the level of disclosure (Aljifri &
Hussainey, 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Celik et al., 2006; Wang
& Hussainey, 2013). In line with prior studies (Arangunen & Ochoa,
2008; Linsley & Shrives, 2006), certain decision rules were followed
for the quantiﬁcation of the level of disclosure. For example, tables
that provided ﬁnancial forward-looking information were inter-
preted as one line equals one sentence.
Before examining annual reports, a preliminary test was per-
formed so as to set up several coding rules. In order to measure
reliability of the coding process, two  annual reports, randomlyresults were very similar.
2 Following Hussainey et al. (2003), voluntary narrative disclosures were ana-
lyzed, such as ﬁnancial highlights, summary results, chairman’s statement, chief
executive ofﬁcer’s review, operating and ﬁnancial review, ﬁnancial review, ﬁnancial
director’s report, ﬁnance review, business review, operating review.
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disclosed by any company in the sample analysed. On  aver-
age, companies disclose over seven sentences containing ﬁnancial26 F. Bravo / Revista de Contabilidad – Span
orward-looking information, the reliability of this variable was
gain veriﬁed at the end of the process.
orporate reputation
Despite the difﬁculties in the measurement of corporate rep-
tation, researchers have stated that most reputable ﬁrms obtain
reater ﬁnancial beneﬁts (Black, Carnes, & Richardson, 2000). Pre-
ious literature in the U.S. context is largely based on the survey
erformed by Fortune magazine to design a measure of corpo-
ate reputation. This magazine provides a list of the most admired
ompanies in the United States. In this survey, executives, direc-
ors and analysts are asked to rate a company on several criteria,
rom investment value to social responsibility. The Fortune survey
esults in some corporate reputation rankings, which are generally
ccepted as a reference for large companies in the United States in
he assessment and management of their reputation.
In order to measure corporate reputation, the ranking for the
World’s Most Admired” companies was used.3 Therefore, corpo-
ate reputation (REP) was a dummy  variable that took a value of 1 if
 ﬁrm was included in Fortune ranking and 0 otherwise. This type of
easure is commonly used in academic journals (Black et al., 2000;
hung, Schneeweis, & Eneroth, 2003; Gallego, Prado, Rodríguez, &
arcía, 2010; Martínez-Ferrero, 2014; Roberts & Dowling, 2002).
ontrol variables
In line with previous studies, several variables that are expected
o inﬂuence stock return volatility were included in the model to
ontrol for potentially omitted relationships.
Leverage (LEV). Leverage is an indicator of the risk of a ﬁrm,
nd the literature predicts a positive association between lever-
ge and stock return volatility (Bushee & Noe, 2000; Rajgopal &
enkatachalam, 2011). The ratio of total debt to total assets was
mployed to calculate leverage.
Firm size (SIZE).  Previous empirical evidence suggests that small
rms experience a higher return volatility (Bushee & Noe, 2000;
astor & Veronesi, 2003). Market value was used as a proxy for
rm size.
Trading volume (TVOL).  Prior research supports a positive con-
ection between trading volume and stock price volatility (Bushee
 Noe, 2000; Kyröläinen, 2008). Trading volume was measured
s the average monthly volume over the year divided by average
hares outstanding.
Firm performance (PERF).  Better performance leads to lower
tock volatility (Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2011). In this study,
rm performance was measured through return on equity.
Growth (GRO).  Growth variables can also affect investors’ deci-
ions (Bushee & Noe, 2000). The variable used to capture company
rowth was changes in sales.
Listing age (AGE).  Older ﬁrms in stock markets experience lower
rowth prospects and this implies a reduction in stock return
olatility (Chok & Sun, 2007; Xu & Malkiel, 2003). Firm age is cal-
ulated as the number of years that a company has been listed in
he New York Stock Exchange.
Book-to-market (BM). Book-to-market is expected to have a neg-
tive inﬂuence on stock return volatility (Bushee & Noe, 2000;
ajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2011). This variable was  measured
hrough the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity.Industry (IND). Return volatility can be correlated with speciﬁc
ndustries (Chok & Sun, 2007; Pastor & Veronesi, 2003). Industries
ere deﬁned in accordance with the Standard Industry Codes (SIC).
3 For detailed information, see http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
ost-admired/.counting Review 19 (1) (2016) 122–131
All the variables included in the empirical analysis are presented
in Table 1, indicating the expected association with stock return
volatility.
Analysis technique
The following model was  initially proposed, in which stock
return volatility is a function of the disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-
looking information, corporate reputation, and all the control
variables:
STDRETt+1 = f (FFLDISCt, REPt, LEVt, SIZEt, TVOLt, PERFt, GROt, AGEt,
BMt, INDkt)
A stepwise regression analysis with backward elimination was
performed to extract signiﬁcant variables from the entire group of
independent variables.4 Although the initial model was built based
on theory, a stepwise regression technique was  used to ascertain
variables that can better predict stock return volatility. Results from
the stepwise regression yield the following expression:
STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1FFLDISCt + ˇ2REPt + ˇ3LEVt + ˇ4SIZEt + ˇ5TVOLt
+ ˇ6PERFt + ε
In the next section, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
are performed to determine the effect of ﬁnancial forward-looking
information and corporate reputation on stock return volatility.
Initially, four statistical models were performed:
Model 1: STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1LEVt + ˇ2SIZEt + ˇ3TVOLt + ˇ4PERFt + ε
Model 2: STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1FFLDISCt + ˇ2LEVt + ˇ3SIZEt + ˇ4TVOLt
+ ˇ5PERFt + ε
Model 3: STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1REPt + ˇ2LEVt + ˇ3SIZEt + ˇ4TVOLt
+ ˇ5PERFt + ε
Model 4: STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1FFLDISCt + ˇ2REPt + ˇ3LEVt + ˇ4SIZEt
+ ˇ5TVOLt + ˇ6PERFt + ε
Additionally, the effect of the ﬁnancial forward-looking infor-
mation is analysed for both most reputable ﬁrms in the sample and
ﬁrms with a lower reputation:
Model 5 (only ﬁrms in Fortune ranking):
STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1FFLDISCt + ˇ2LEVt + ˇ3SIZEt + ˇ4TVOLt
+ ˇ5PERFt + ε
Model 6 (excluding ﬁrms in Fortune ranking):
STDRETt+1 =  ˛ + ˇ1FFLDISCt + ˇ2LEVt + ˇ3SIZEt + ˇ4TVOLt
+ ˇ5PERFt + ε
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable
included in the statistical models. Results show divergences in
disclosure strategies. Not all companies in the sample disclose
ﬁnancial forward-looking information, with 20 sentences as the
maximum number of sentences with this type of informationforward-looking information. If this information is value-relevant
4 This method involves computing a regression equation with all the predictor
variables, then going back and deleting those independent variables that fail to con-
tribute signiﬁcantly. Stepwise regression uses chi-square statistics to automatically
determine which variable to omit from the model.
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Table  1
Deﬁnition and measurement of variables.
Variables Description Measurement Expected sign
STDRET Stock return volatility One plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns
FFLDIS Financial forward-looking disclosure Number of sentences with ﬁnancial forward-looking information −
REP  Corporate reputation 1 if the ﬁrm appears in the Fortune magazine ranking; 0 otherwise −
LEV  Financial leverage Total debt/total assets +
SIZE  Firm size Market value −
TVOL  Trading volume Average monthly volume/average shares outstanding +
PERF  Firm performance Return on equity −
GRO  Firm growth Change in sales −
AGE  Listing age Number of years listed on NYSE −
BM  Book-to-market Book value of equity/market value of equity −
IND  Industry 1 if the company operates in a speciﬁc industry; 0 otherwise +/−
Table 2
Descriptive statistics (73 companies).
Variablesa Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
STDRET 0.0018 0.0085 0.0385 0.0123
FFLDIS  7.89 4.846 0 20
REP  0.72 0.449 0 1
LEV  0.594 0.176 0.111 0.970
SIZE  56,651,892.337 57,160,267.375 6,074,965.695 338,511,388.359
TVOL  324,549,312.731 334,307,437.399 31,382,413.917 1,616,580,071.583
PERF  0.076 0.065 −0.084 0.340
a STDRET is calculated as one plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns. FFLDIS refers to the number of sentences with ﬁnancial forward-looking
information. REP is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in Fortune ranking and 0 otherwise. LEV is computed as the ratio total debt to total assets.
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rIZE  refers to market value of equity (thousand of euros). TVOL is measured as the
easured by the ratio net income by total equity.
or investors, then an impact on stock return volatility would be
xpected. Over 70% of companies are included in the ranking on
orporate reputation published by Fortune magazine. The compa-
ies that appear on that list are expected to be trustworthy for
nvestors and this would lead to mitigation in stock volatility. The
ispersion of most variables is on an acceptable level. Outliers and
nﬂuential observations were not found.
ivariate correlations and validation of the dependent variable
Table 3 shows the bivariate correlations between the variables
ncluded in the statistical models. As no bivariate correlation is high,
here is initial evidence about the lack of multicollinearity between
ariables.
As predicted, the disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-looking infor-
ation and corporate reputation are negatively correlated withtock volatility. In line with previous literature, stock return volatil-
ty presents the expected correlation with most of the control
ariables. Stock return volatility presents a positive association
ith trading volume, and indicates a negative correlation with ﬁrm
able 3
orrelation matrix.
STDRET FFLDIS REP 
STDRET 1
FFLDIS −0.276** 1
REP −0.247** −0.166 1
LEV  −0.088 0.214* −0.064 
SIZE  −0.323*** −0.011 0.153 
TVOL  0.270** 0.000 −0.108 
PERF  −0.291** 0.075 −0.180 
TDRET is calculated as one plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns. FF
EP  is a dummy  variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in Fortune ranking an
arket value of equity (thousand of euros). TVOL is measured as the average monthly vol
atio  net income by total equity.
* p-value < 0.1.
** p-value < 0.05.
*** p-value < 0.01.ge monthly volume over the year divided by average shares outstanding. PERF is
size and ﬁrm performance. These results validate our data about the
calculation of stock return volatility since there is no contradiction
with theoretical arguments and they ﬁt in with previous studies.
Financial forward-looking information is found to be associ-
ated with leverage. This correlation conﬁrms the evidence shown
by prior literature (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Mathuva, 2012) that
assumes that debt ratio could be used as indicator of ﬁrms’ risks.
Companies with a high debt ratio can disclose more ﬁnancial
forward-looking information to reduce their ﬁnance costs.
The validity of the dependent variable of the study (STDRET)
can also be assessed by examining the correlation matrix. A robust
measure of the risk of a company is known to be negatively asso-
ciated with ﬁrm size (Botosan, 1997). Since stock return volatility
should capture the risk of ﬁrm, a negative relationship with ﬁrm
size is implied, as shown in Table 3. Moreover, the systematic risk
of a company (BETA) is also widely accepted as a measure of risk
(Botosan, 1997; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Fama & French, 1992). In
order to assess the validity of STDRET, Table 4 shows the results
from a regression of STDRET on beta and size, and all the expected
aforementioned relationships are conﬁrmed.
LEV SIZE TVOL PERF
1
−0.211* 1
−0.004 0.313** 1
−0.291** 0.113 −0.274** 1
LDIS refers to the number of sentences with ﬁnancial forward-looking information.
d 0 otherwise. LEV is computed as the ratio total debt to total assets. SIZE refers to
ume over the year divided by average shares outstanding. PERF is measured by the
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Table 4
Regression of STDRET on market value and beta.
Intercept Beta Size Adjusted R2 F (p-value)
Coefﬁcient 0.000 (0.118) 0.547** (0.000) −0.176* (0.076) 0.364 21.646**
STDRET is calculated as one plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns. BETA is calculated from a market model by considering daily returns over an annual
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reriod. SIZE refers to market value of equity (thousand of euros).
* p-value < 0.1.
** p-value < 0.01.
ultivariate analysis
In order to test the hypotheses developed in the paper, several
tatistical models are performed. The assumptions underlying the
egression model are veriﬁed for all the models, and no problems
bout multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity are present.
Table 5 contains six models including a variety of explanatory
ariables to predict stock return volatility.
Model 1 includes only control variables for stock return volatil-
ty that have been traditionally considered in prior literature. The
bjective of this model is to conﬁrm that there are no contradic-
ory ﬁndings with previous studies, which could affect analysis in
 later stage. The results are as expected. The explanatory power of
he model is 29% and the expected sign is determined for the asso-
iation between stock return volatility and all the variables, except
or leverage.
In addition to those explanatory variables above, Model 2 also
onsiders, as an independent variable, the disclosure of ﬁnancial
orward-looking information (FFLDIS). The regression shows how
his variable individually helps to explain the level of stock return
olatility beyond that of the control variables. The adjusted R2 in
odel 2 increases 3.8%. The new independent variable is signiﬁcant
t a 5% level, and has a negative association with stock volatil-
ty. Results from Model 2 indicate that the disclosure of ﬁnancial
orward-looking information leads to an incremental reduction in
tock return volatility. These ﬁndings conﬁrm theoretical argu-
ents proposed about the effect of this type of information on
apital markets, and hence hypothesis H1 is supported.
For a better understanding of the association between reputa-
ion and stock return volatility, the individual effect of corporate
eputation is presented in Model 3. Moreover, the complemen-
ary effect of corporate reputation together with the disclosure of
nancial forward-looking information is shown in Model 4.Model 3 adds, as an independent variable, only corporate rep-
tation (REP) to the control variables in order to test for the
ndividual impact of corporate reputation on stock volatility. The
able 5
egression analysis.
Model 1 Model 2 Mod
Intercept 5.649*** 6.151*** 6.17
FFLDIS −0.222**
REP  −0.22
LEV −0.146 −0.110 −0.14
SIZE −0.440*** −0.445*** −0.37
TRA 0.349*** 0.364*** 0.28
PERF  −0.192* −0.148 −0.25
R2 0.329 0.375 0.37
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.328 0.32
F  (p-value) 8.346*** 8.030*** 8.03
TDRET is calculated as one plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns. FF
EP  is a dummy  variable with a value of 1 if a company is included in Fortune ranking an
arket  value of equity (thousand of euros). TVOL is measured as the average monthly vol
atio  net income by total equity.
* p-value < 0.1.
** p-value < 0.05.
*** p-value < 0.01.adjusted R2 in this model increases 3.8% in comparison with Model
1. This result indicates that corporate reputation individually helps
to predict the level of stock return volatility, and has an incremental
effect over the control variables. This incremental effect on explana-
tory power of the model is exactly the same than the additional
effect presented for FFLDIS in Model 2.
Model 4 studies the complementary effect on stock return
volatility of FFLDIS and REP, both of which are included as indepen-
dent variables. The expected relationships between each of these
variables and STDRET remain signiﬁcant. The explanatory power of
Model 4 reaches 36.1%, the highest value of all models. This value
represents a rise of 7.1% compared with Model 1, and an increase of
3.3% compared with Model 3. In addition, all the control variables
appear to be signiﬁcant in this model. It can therefore be stated that
the joint consideration of FFLDIS and REP add explanatory power
to the previous models, and these variables play a complementary
role in the reduction of stock volatility.
Although it is commonly accepted that reputation is an essential
part of a company’s intangible assets, its effect on stock value still
remains unclear for academics and practitioners (Gök & Özkaya,
2011). Results from Models 3 and 4 conﬁrm that reputation is a key
factor that reduces investors’ uncertainty and also causes a direct
impact on stock volatility.
Two additional models are added in order to examine whether
the information disclosed by companies of a higher reputation has
an even greater effect on stock return volatility. In Model 5, the
effect of ﬁnancial forward-looking information is analysed for ﬁrms
of a higher reputation. Only those companies included in the rep-
utation ranking provided by Fortune magazine are considered. In
Model 6, the analysis is replicated for companies with lower reputa-
tion (those not included in Fortune ranking). Results reveal that the
disclosure of ﬁnancial forward-looking information has an effect on
stock volatility only for ﬁrms of a higher reputation. This result may
be explained because corporate reputation, as predicted, affects
the way investors perceive the information disclosed by ﬁrms. This
evidence supports hypothesis H2.
el 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
0*** 6.586*** 0.000*** 0.000***
−0.207** −0.233* 0.094
8** −0.213**
9 −0.116** −0.143 −0.405*
9*** −0.388*** −0.456*** −0.280*
7** 0.305*** 0.387*** 0.198
8** −0.212** −0.189 0.239
5 0.414 0.359 0.503
8 0.361 0.291 0.325
4*** 7.773*** 5.264*** 2.833*
LDIS refers to the number of sentences with ﬁnancial forward-looking information.
d 0 otherwise. LEV is computed as the ratio total debt to total assets. SIZE refers to
ume over the year divided by average shares outstanding. PERF is measured by the
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Table  6
First-stage regression of FFLDIS.
Model 2 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept −36.694*** −33.534*** −33.776***
BIND 0.530*** 0.590*** 0.465***
FIXED ASSET 0.262*** 0.052 0.235**
LEV 0.299*** 0.622*** 0.238*
SIZE −0.150** 0.160 −0.337***
TRA 0.248*** 0.314* 0.245**
PERF 0.349*** 0.144 0.445***
R2 0.441 0.708 0.453
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.573 0.382
F  (p-value) 12.18** 7.91*** 7.76***
STDRET is calculated as one plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock
returns. BIND refers to the proportion of independent directors. CAP INT is the nat-
ural logarithm of ﬁxed assets. LEV is computed as the ratio total debt to total assets.
SIZE refers to market value of equity (thousand of euros). TVOL is measured as the
average monthly volume over the year divided by average shares outstanding. PERF
is  measured by the ratio net income by total equity.
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Table 7
Second-stage regression (GMM estimation).
Model 2 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
FFLDIS −0.301** −0.256* −0.291
LEV −0.163* −0.102 −0.445
SIZE −0.416*** −0.351*** −0.443
TRA 0.339*** 0.351* 0.183
PERF −0.125 −0.154 −0.231**
Hansen J-statistic 2.441 (0.118) 0.597 (0.440) 1.727 (0.189)
STDRET is calculated as one plus the log of the standard deviation of daily stock
returns. FFLDIS refers to the level of ﬁnancial forward-looking information, instru-
mented by board independence and capital intensity. LEV is computed as the ratio
total debt to total assets. SIZE refers to market value of equity (thousand of euros).
TVOL is measured as the average monthly volume over the year divided by average
shares outstanding. PERF is measured by the ratio net income by total equity.
* p-value < 0.1.p-value < 0.1.
** p-value < 0.05.
*** p-value < 0.01.
A potential problem in the analyses of linkages between vol-
ntary disclosure and ﬁrm outcomes is the issue of endogeneity
etween the dependent and independent variables. In order
o address this concern, instrumental variables were used to
redict values of the measure of voluntary disclosure. The ideal
nstrumental variables should be highly related to the endogenous
ndependent variable and unrelated to the dependent variable
Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). In this study, two instrumental variables
ere used to predict the level of voluntary ﬁnancial forward-
ooking information: board independence and capital intensity.
n a theoretical level, these variables should be determinants of
nancial forward-looking information but should bear no relation-
hip to the stock return volatility. A correlation analysis reveals
hat these variables correlate with the level of this information but
ot with stock volatility. First, board independence is traditionally
onsidered to be effective in monitoring managerial opportunism
Fama & Jensen, 1983), and companies with a higher proportion
f independent directors can be expected to have more voluntary
isclosures. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) conﬁrm the
xistence of a positive relationship between board independence
nd voluntary disclosures, especially in those countries, such as
he United States, with high investor protection rights and with
rms that are more proactive towards disclosing information. On
he other hand, capital intensity (CAP INT) is also expected to be
ositively related to voluntary disclosure choices, since ﬁrms’ will-
ngness to disclose information increases with an increase in their
emand for capital (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990). Table 6
resents the results of the ﬁrst-stage OLS regression, which enables
he level of ﬁnancial forward-looking information to be predicted
y means of the instrumental variables. In Table 7, the results of
he instrumental variable estimation (2-Step GMM  estimation)
re shown. In this stage, the effect of ﬁnancial forward-looking
nformation on stock return volatility is analysed, where the level
f this information is instrumented by using board independence
nd capital intensity. In order to conﬁrm the hypotheses, the mod-
ls that contain the disclosure of information as an independent
ariable are included. The validity of the instruments ﬁnally used
s conﬁrmed through Hansen’s test. The literature assumes that
-values over 0.10 signal that the instruments are uncorrelated
ith the error term (Acero Fraile & Alcalde Fradejas, 2012; García-
astro, Arin˜o, & Canela, 2010). Results from Table 7 (Model 2)
how that there is a negative association between the disclosure of
nancial forward-looking information and stock return volatility.
odels 5 and 6 analyse this relationship for both more reputable
nd less reputable ﬁrms respectively. Results again indicate that** p-value < 0.05.
*** p-value < 0.01.
the association between ﬁnancial forward-looking information and
stock volatility is only signiﬁcant for ﬁrms with a higher reputation.
Discussion of results
Results indicate that there is a negative association between
ﬁnancial forward-looking information disclosed in annual reports
and stock return volatility. Regardless of speciﬁc ﬁrm charac-
teristics, companies that provide more ﬁnancial forward-looking
information are more likely to reduce their stock return volatility.
The theoretical arguments are conﬁrmed and hypothesis H1
is supported. In line with agency theory, this evidence can be
explained because the disclosure of this information can reduce
the information gap between ﬁrms and investors. Investors take
advantage of ﬁnancial forward-looking information, and hence
this information constitutes a mechanism to mitigate instability in
share price. Although prior literature demonstrates that informa-
tion quality has an effect on capital markets, this study shows that
speciﬁc forward-looking information helps to reduce stock volatil-
ity. In line with previous literature, these results also conﬁrm that
annual reports remain important vehicles for corporate managers
to disclose voluntary information.
This paper suggests that the disclosure of this kind of speciﬁc
information is highly relevant, since it triggers reactions in capi-
tal markets; however, the content is not the only factor. Not only
does this paper indicate that ﬁnancial forward-looking information
has signiﬁcant effects on capital markets, but it also shows that the
information disclosed by ﬁrms of a higher reputation can be more
credible for capital market participants. The disclosure of informa-
tion by companies of a higher reputation is more readily accepted
as more credible, and hence, it is more effective in reducing stock
return volatility.
The expected relationship between corporate reputation and
the effectiveness of forward-looking information in the reduction of
stock volatility is conﬁrmed and hypothesis H2 is supported. This is
the ﬁrst study that demonstrates that corporate reputation mode-
rates the effects of forward-looking information in capital markets.
Corporate reputation may  cause a psychological bias in investors,
who perceive companies with a high reputation as more solid and
reliable. Therefore, corporate reputation can inﬂuence the inter-
pretation and the perception of the information disclosed by ﬁrms.
If investors perceive that information disclosed by companies of a
high reputation is more credible, then the uncertainty towards a
company can be minimised.
Our results are robust to various regression methods. Instru-
mental variables are used to address the potential endogeneity
issue between stock volatility and the disclosure of ﬁnancial
1 ish Ac
f
s
C
g
d
i
s
t
d
s
t
ﬁ
S
o
r
d
p
c
b
l
t
i
t
t
c
c
w
a
f
p
r
r
t
d
c
e
ﬁ
a
s
s
t
o
f
t
m
b
t
p
c
m
m
i
ﬁ
o
y
T
R
c
t30 F. Bravo / Revista de Contabilidad – Span
orward-looking information. The results from the GMM  estimation
upport hypotheses H1 and H2.
onclusion remarks
There is an ongoing debate about the effects of disclosure strate-
ies in capital markets. Previous literature has examined ﬁrms’
isclosure practices as a potential solution to agency problems and
nformation asymmetries. This study validates and broadens the
cope of prior empirical studies of the factors that are considered
o have an effect stock return volatility. Financial forward-looking
isclosure is studied in order to determine whether it could be
trategically used to minimise stock volatility. In order to quan-
ify the level of ﬁnancial forward-looking information disclosed by
rms, a content analysis is conducted over the companies listed on
tandard and Poor’s 100. Additionally, this paper analyses the role
f corporate reputation as a mechanism for the reduction of stock
eturn volatility.
Results show that the ﬁnancial forward-looking information
isclosed in annual reports helps to reduce stock volatility. This
aper contributes to the existing literature on forward-looking dis-
losure since stock volatility has become a signiﬁcant concern for
oth regulators and managers. An increase in this variable would
ead to a perception of a higher risk of a ﬁrm, and hence a rise in
he cost of capital of companies (Bushee & Noe, 2000). This analysis
mplies a step forward in disclosure literature, and provides cer-
ain practical implications for both managers and regulators, since
he understanding of the effect of speciﬁc disclosure strategies in
apital markets can be improved. These results have direct a impli-
ation for managers, who may  strategically use this information
hen designing disclosure policies to inﬂuence investors. Addition-
lly, in the U.S. context, these results hold signiﬁcant implications
or companies because the “safe harbor” rules protect ﬁrms from
otential adverse repercussions due to the disclosure of inaccu-
ate forward-looking information in the SEC ﬁlings and the annual
eports. These ﬁndings also have direct implications for regula-
ory bodies in the preparation of rules and recommendations about
isclosure requirements. These ﬁndings also constitute a signiﬁ-
ant contribution towards the debate concerning the need for the
stablishment of speciﬁc guidelines regarding the disclosure of this
nancial forward-looking information.
Results also indicate that, although the level of disclosure has
 signiﬁcant effect on stock volatility, the effect of this disclo-
ure is further varied depending on corporate reputation. This
tudy extends previous research by showing that the interpreta-
ion and the effectiveness of forward-looking information depends
n the reputation of a ﬁrm. Disclosure studies have previously
ocused on the disclosure process, but more effort is needed in
his area to analyse how investors’ perceptions about a company
ay  inﬂuence the effects of the disclosed information. Although the
eneﬁts of corporate reputation have largely been discussed from
he resource-based view, this theory can be extended because cor-
orate reputation is shown to inﬂuence the reporting process of
ompanies. This evidence also has implications for managers, who
ust be made aware of the importance of the achievement and
aintenance of a good reputation. Corporate reputation plays an
mportant role in the disclosure process since the reputation of a
rm appears to be crucial in the effectiveness of its information.
Like all studies, this paper presents several limitations. One
f the common limitations of studies that employ content anal-
sis techniques by using hand-collected data is the sample size.
his research focuses only on U.S. companies for one speciﬁc year.
esearch on this topic may  be extended by analysing different
ontexts. Future research lines can also consider relevant factors
hat might moderate the analysed relationship between voluntarycounting Review 19 (1) (2016) 122–131
forward-looking disclosure and stock volatility, such as corporate
governance and/or the legal environment. Despite the limitations
presented in this study, sensitivity analyses for the main variables
were performed and different regression models were used in order
to increase the robustness of the results. Our evidence provides
several interesting insights about potential mechanisms in order
to reduce information asymmetries in the markets, and they create
new and encouraging opportunities for research.
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